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Unbranding Confrontation as Only a Trial
Right
Shaakirrah R. Sanders*
This Article challenges the oft-cited but unpersuasive rule that the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause only applies at the trial stage of a “criminal prosecution.” I
examine the most likely interpretation of the term “criminal prosecution” at the time of
the Founding and conclude that the term would have included felony sentencing. I
explore the Counsel Clause’s early rejection of the “trial-right-only” rule and the recent
erosion of the “trial-right-only” rule with regard to the Jury Trial Clause in Alleyne v.
United States. I advocate for eliminating the trial-right-only theory of the Confrontation
Clause to allow cross-examination of testimonial statements that are material to
punishment and where cross-examination assists in assessing truth and veracity. In such
cases, I advocate a practical application of the fundamental right to confront witnesses
during felony sentencing. Ultimately, I propose a uniform application of the Sixth
Amendment’s structurally identical Counsel, Jury Trial, and Confrontation Clauses at
felony sentencing.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. I would like to thank
participants of the 2013 Southeast/Southwest People of Color Conference, participants of the
2013 Inland Northwest Junior Scholar’s Conference, and my colleagues at the University of Idaho
College of Law for their review and critique of this work.
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Introduction
This is the second work in which I advocate for the extension of
confrontation rights at felony sentencing hearings. In the first work,
1
Making the Right Call for Confrontation at Felony Sentencing, I
examined and challenged whether judicial authority existed in preFounding felony cases to consider un-cross-examined testimony for
purposes of fixing punishment. This Article examines and challenges
another popular argument against confrontation at felony sentencing: that
confrontation only applies at the trial stage of the “criminal prosecution.”
The majority of the federal circuit courts that have examined the
question of confrontation rights at felony sentencing have ruled that the
2
Confrontation Clause is a right that only applies at trial. I reexamine this

1. Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Making the Right Call for Confrontation at Felony Sentencing, 47 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 791 (2014).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Francis, 39 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a criminal
sentencing hearing is not within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment); United States v. Petty,
982 F.2d 1365, 1367–70 (9th Cir. 1993) (agreeing that confrontation rights do not apply at sentencing),
amended by 992 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1511 (6th Cir.
1992) (en banc) (finding that confrontation is among those rights that are applicable at trial, but not
sentencing); United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1287 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[A] defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses . . . does not attach during the sentencing phase.”); United
States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 50–52 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that cross-examination at sentencing is
not required of probation officers regarding the substance of information included in the presentence
report); United States v. Marshall, 910 F.2d 1241, 1244 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that hearsay is
admissible for sentencing purposes); United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1180–81 (10th Cir. 1990)
(distinguishing between rights at trial and rights at sentencing and concluding that confrontation rights
do not apply at sentencing); United States v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1541 (10th Cir. 1987)
(“Because restitution hearings are part of the sentencing process, [only] the Due Process Clause
applies.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 711–12 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[M]ost of
the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences
would be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to
cross-examination.”) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949))). But see United States
v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100, 103–04 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that while there is a right to cross-examine
witnesses at criminal sentencing, the hearsay standard of reliability governs confrontation challenges),
overruled by United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 400 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“[P]rotections of the

June 2014]

UNBRANDING CONFRONTATION

1259

approach and contribute to the scholarship surrounding the fundamental
right of confrontation, arguing that this right should in fact extend through
3
felony sentencing.
Although recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence mandates
4
cross-examination of testimonial statements at trial, those new rules do
5
not apply for purposes of felony sentencing. However, the adversarial
process does not end once a plea or verdict of guilt is rendered; it extends
through felony sentencing. Testing the veracity of testimonial statements
that are material to punishment is as compelling at felony sentencing as
at trial, because felony sentencing courts have discretion to increase
punishment based on un-cross-examined testimonial statements about
6
several categories of unproven criminal conduct. Thus, such findings of
7
fact are as qualitatively vital as those made during trial. Due to the
8
current system of plea bargaining, the vast majority of felony defendants
do not have the opportunity to test the veracity of testimonial statements
made against them before the sentencing hearing. As such, the
fundamental right to cross-examine a witness is unavailable at the most
9
critical stage of the criminal prosecution: the sentencing hearing.

right of confrontation apply at the guilt phase, but it does not follow that the same protections apply at
sentencing simply because facts proved at sentencing may increase a defendant’s sentence.”).
3. Readers may be surprised to discover the impressive amount of student scholarship related to
the subjects of this work. See, e.g., Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines’
Failure to Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 1993 Wis. L.
Rev. 187; Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 Yale L.J. 933 (1995); Amanda Harris, Note, Surpassing
Sentencing: The Controversial Next Step in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1447
(2012); David A. Hoffman, Note, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Confrontation Rights,
42 Duke L.J. 382 (1992); Nigel Hugh Holder, Comment, Confrontation at Sentencing: The Logical
Connection Between Crawford and Blakely, 49 How. L.J. 179 (2005); Christine Holst, Note, The
Confrontation Clause and Pretrial Hearings: A Due Process Solution, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1599; Note,
An Argument for Confrontation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1880
(1992); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 821 (1968).
4. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004).
5. See Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d at 1543 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 211 (1972)) (“The
right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”); see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
6. Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959) (affirming Williams, 337 U.S. at 241, and
holding that sentencing judge is not restricted to evidence presented at trial for purposes fixing
punishment). See generally Eang Ngov, Judicial Nullification of Juries: Use of Acquitted Conduct at
Sentencing, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 235, 281–83 (2009). But see Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 607–11
(1967) (holding that Colorado may not convict under one statute that authorizes a maximum sentence
of ten years, but sentence for an indeterminate term under another statute).
7. Edward R. Becker, Insuring Reliable Fact Finding in Guidelines Sentencing: Must the
Guarantees of the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses Be Applied?, 2 Cap. U. L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (1993)
(describing steps of guidelines sentencing).
8. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (citation omitted) (noting that ninety-seven
percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions result from a plea of guilty).
9. See Becker, supra note 7, at 14–16; see also Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker,
38 Ariz. St. L.J. 387, 391 (2006).
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The Confrontation Clause is not the only fundamental Sixth
Amendment right to be branded a right that only applies at trial. In the
past, neither the Counsel nor the Jury Trial Clauses automatically applied
10
at felony sentencing. Gideon v. Wainwright eventually applied the
11
Counsel Clause to all critical stages of the criminal prosecution, which
12
was ultimately deemed to include sentencing in Mempa v. Rhay.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania initially established that the Jury Trial Clause
only applied to “elements” of the offense, not to “enhancements” to the
13
punishment. The distinction proved significant considering that elements
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and enhancements
14
could be established by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing.
Apprendi v. New Jersey radically changed the trial “element” versus
sentencing “enhancement” distinction and applied the Jury Trial Clause
15
to any fact that increased the statutory maximum punishment. During
the 2013 term, the Court quietly but dramatically expanded the scope of
Apprendi to include mandatory minimum sentences in Alleyne v. United
16
States.
I advocate for reexamination of the theory that the Confrontation
Clause is a right that only applies at trial. The Counsel, Confrontation,
and Jury Trial Clauses are structurally identical and appear to apply in a
17
broad sense “[i]n all criminal prosecutions.” Each has been deemed
18
essential to our system of criminal prosecutions but until recently it was
generally well accepted that the Confrontation Clause only “reflect[ed] a
19
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial.” Previously, there was

10. See Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 487, 520–21
(2009) (discussing the Court’s interpretation of “criminal prosecution,” the meaning of which depends
on the procedural right at issue, and advocating for a broad definition based on the term “criminal
offense”); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause makes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel obligatory on the
states); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403–08 (1965) (incorporating the Confrontation Clause);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (incorporating the Jury Trial Clause). These cases were
decided within six years of each other.
11. 372 U.S. at 343–45 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)).
12. 389 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1967).
13. 477 U.S. 79, 83–91 (1986).
14. Id. at 91.
15. 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
16. 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013).
17. See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
18. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963) (deeming the right to counsel
fundamental); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (noting that the appearance of confrontation
rights in the Sixth Amendment’s text reflects the Framers’ belief that “confrontation was a
fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149 (1968) (“[W]e believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice.”).
19. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (emphasis added), abrogated by Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846–48 (1990) (reasoning

June 2014]

UNBRANDING CONFRONTATION

1261

a close link between the Confrontation Clause and due process-based
20
hearsay rules. The understanding of lower courts that examined the
applicability of the Confrontation Clause at felony sentencing was that
confrontation and hearsay both originated from due process and were
21
designed to protect similar values—trustworthiness and reliability. But
the Court’s re-examination of the historical origin and text of the
Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington established that “[w]here
testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution
22
actually prescribes: confrontation.”
This Article proposes uniform application of the Sixth Amendment’s
Counsel, Jury Trial, and Confrontation Clauses at felony sentencing. I
argue the Confrontation Clause should apply at what is now the most
critical post-verdict stage of felony criminal prosecutions where testimonial
statements are at issue: the sentencing hearing. Part I discusses the Sixth
Amendment’s text and structure, and the pre-Founding model of
determinate sentencing. It also explains the origin of the trial-right-only
rule and discusses the Counsel Clause’s early rejection of the theory.
Part II discusses the decline of indeterminate sentencing as the dominant
model for fixing punishment in the United States. It also discusses the
decades-long erosion of the trial-right-only theory of the Jury Trial
Clause, as demonstrated in 2013 in Alleyne. Part III explains why
Counsel and Jury Trial Clause jurisprudence, as well as the Court’s
recent interpretations of the Confrontation Clause, control the issue of
whether cross-examination should be allowed at felony sentencing.
Ultimately, I argue that where testimonial statements are material to
punishment and where cross-examination will assist the fact finder in
assessing truth, confrontation should be branded as a right that applies
through sentencing.

that the primary purpose of confrontation is to ensure reliability, but that face-to-face confrontation is
only a preference).
20. See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102–03 (3d Cir. 1990), overruled by United
States v. Grier, 449 F.3d 558 (2006) (arguing that confrontation violations occur only when a court
relies on misinformation of a constitutional magnitude because hearsay is normally considered at
sentencing as long as the due process standard is met); see also Chhablani, supra note 10, at 498–99
(discussing the Burger Court and its reading of confrontation rights to require a showing of
unreliability as a definitional element).
21. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (“[It is a] truism that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause
are generally designed to protect similar values, and stem from the same roots.” (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); G. Michael Fenner, Today’s Confrontation Clause (After
Crawford and Melendez-Diaz), 43 Creighton L. Rev. 35, 37 (2009) (noting that until Crawford,
confrontation jurisprudence “more or less tracked the hearsay rule”); see also supra note 2.
22. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69. “Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation . . . [which] reflects a judgment . . . about how
reliability can be best determined.” Id. at 61.
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I. Origin and Early Rejection of the Counsel Clause as Only a
Trial Right
The rule that confrontation does not apply at felony sentencing
relies on a reading of the Sixth Amendment that is not apparent from the
23
text itself. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
24
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

The introductory clause, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,” prefaces all
25
of the included procedural rights and protections, of which there are as
many as seven. This Article focuses on three: the Counsel, Jury Trial, and
26
Confrontation Clauses.
The Sixth Amendment is silent with regard to whether sentencing is
part of the “criminal prosecution,” a term that the Amendment leaves
undefined. Moreover, Founding era documents do not provide guidance
27
on the meaning or scope of the term. This is not surprising, because at
28
the time of ratification, felony sentencing was determinate. Essentially,
sentencing proceedings were “virtually indistinguishable from the process
29
of conviction.” Felony crimes were submitted to a jury and punishment

23. Benjamin C. McMurray, Challenging Untested Facts at Sentencing: The Applicability of
Crawford at Sentencing After Booker, 37 McGeorge L. Rev. 589, 605–07 (2006) (discussing lower
court’s “fail[ure] to seriously engage the text of the Sixth Amendment” in ruling that confrontation did
not apply at felony sentencing).
24. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
25. McMurray, supra note 23, at 615.
26. Chhablani, supra note 10, at 492 (explaining seven procedural protections under the Sixth
Amendment).
27. See McMurray, supra note 23, at 616, 616 n.191; Stephanos Bibas, Two Cheers, Not Three, for
Sixth Amendment Originalism, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 45, 46 (2011).
28. John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing,
105 Colum. L. Rev. 1967, 2011 (2005) (cautioning against the conclusion that history suggests that “the
Sixth Amendment contemplates no sentencing rights” simply “because it contemplates no separate
sentencing proceeding”).
29. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at
Sentencing, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 47, 51 (2011) (noting that colonial judges did not conduct a formal
sentencing proceeding following conviction, and that most crimes instead carried a particular penalty
and the conviction determined the punishment); see also Bibas, supra note 27, at 46 (“Eighteenthcentury trials contained no sentencing phase.”); Douglass, supra note 28, at 1972 (noting that unitary
guilt and sentencing phases for capital trials were the norm at the time of the Founding); Penny J.
White, “He Said,” “She Said,” and Issues of Life and Death: The Right to Confrontation at Capital
Sentencing Proceedings, 19 Regent U. L. Rev. 387, 396 (2007) (“When the Sixth Amendment was
adopted . . . the sentencing decision was ‘collaps[ed] . . . into the proceeding for determining guilt.’”).
See generally Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 289, 302–03 (1992).
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was linked to the crime. This model of “unitary prosecution” required
felony “sentencing evidence” to be presented to a jury and confronted by
32
defense counsel during the trial. The trial was the sentencing in purpose
33
and effect.
34
An “original objective meaning” interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment supports the argument that pre-Founding “criminal
35
prosecutions” included sentencing. An early nineteenth century
dictionary defined the term “prosecution” as the “institution or
commencement and continuance of a criminal suit; the process of
exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal tribunal, and

30. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000); see also 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *376 (requiring that after verdict, “the court must pronounce that judgment, which the
law hath annexed to the crime”); Bibas, supra note 27, at 46, 48 (noting that after a conviction the
punishment was immediately imposed); Douglass, supra note 28, at 1977 (describing English and early
American criminal law as dominated by mandatory penalties, not by sentencing discretion);
McMurray, supra note 23, at 592 (describing sentences in the determinate era as corporal punishment
or specific fine and noting that from the face of the charging instrument, defendants could predict a
sentence with precision); White, supra note 29, at 397 (characterizing substantive criminal law as
sanction-specific or prescribing a specific sentence for an offense).
31. Douglass, supra note 28, at 2008; White, supra note 29, at 397 (noting that in 1789, two years
before ratification of the Sixth Amendment, “‘criminal prosecution[s]’ began with the return of an
indictment that contained sufficient facts to notify the defendant of the charge. The jury in the case
then heard the evidence and determined both the guilt and the punishment of the defendant.”).
32. The rules appeared to be different for misdemeanors. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 480 n.7
(noting that colonial sentencing judges frequently imposed fines in misdemeanor cases); see also
Douglass, supra note 28, at 2016 (noting that in the late eighteenth century, English and colonial
American judges exercised discretion in punishing misdemeanants).
33. See Douglass, supra note 28, at 1972 (“Bifurcation—separating the guilt determination from
the choice of an appropriate penalty—was a procedure that evolved after the [F]ounding, initially for
noncapital sentencing.”); see also Hessick & Hessick, supra note 29, at 51 (describing pre-Founding
sentencing as part of the trial).
34. “Original objective meaning” or “original public meaning” refers to “the reasonable meaning
of the text of the Constitution at the time of the framing.” Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the
Records of the State Ratifying Conventions As a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S.
Constitution, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 457, 462. According to Maggs, some Justices, particularly Antonin
Scalia, consider this meaning to be the most significant. Id. As used in this work, “original objective
meaning” should be distinguished from “original intent” and “original understanding.” Original intent
is the meaning the Constitution’s Framers intended, i.e., the meaning and intention of the convention
that framed and proposed the Constitution for adoption and ratification in the states. Id. at 461.
Original understanding refers to what those persons who participated in state ratifying conventions
thought the Constitution meant. Id.
35. See Douglass, supra note 28, at 2008 (arguing that the answer to the question whether
sentencing is part of the “criminal prosecution” is self-evident because “why bother with the process of
criminal prosecution if not for the sentence?”); see also White, supra note 29, at 393 (asserting that the
argument that the right to confront applies at a capital sentencing hearing is supported by a simple
reading of the relevant constitutional text). At least one jurist agreed with Douglass and White.
United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 407 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Surely no one would contend that sentencing is not a part, and a vital one, of a
‘criminal prosecution.’”).
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36

pursuing them to final judgment.” Eminent pre-Founding scholar
37
William Blackstone described twelve stages of the prosecution, ranging
38
from the arrest to execution. Blackstone did not specifically list or
39
separately label sentencing hearings. But his ninth stage, which was
labeled “Judgment, and its consequences,” corresponds to our modern
40
understanding of criminal sentencing. In fact, at sentencing modern
41
courts do precisely what Blackstone described at the “judgment” stage.
Contemporary scholarship agrees with Blackstone’s description of the
42
sentencing process as one stage of a criminal prosecution. Francis
Heller, a mid-twentieth century historian, explained that the “criminal
prosecution” started at arraignment and ended after the sentence was
43
announced, unless the defendant was found not guilty.
Unfortunately, no post-ratification Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
provides insight into the question of whether pre-Founding “criminal
prosecutions” included sentencing. Supreme Court decisions regarding
the scope of Sixth Amendment rights at felony sentencing hearings do
44
not appear until the early twentieth century, when in Johnson v. Zerbst
the Court turned its attention to the Counsel Clause. Johnson was

36. See 2 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 45 (1828)
(emphasis added); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); Random House
Dictionary of the English Language 1552 (2d ed. 1987). These definitions clarify that the term
“criminal prosecution” is properly recognized to include all aspects of the criminal proceedings, from
charging to punishment or acquittal.
37. The standard way of determining original objective meaning of the words and phrases of the
Constitution is to examine founding period writings. See Maggs, supra note 34, at 462; see also
McMurray, supra note 23, at 616–17, 616–18 nn.190–99. “Scholars concerned with an original
understanding of the term ‘prosecution’ are likely to ask how the term was understood by . . . the
scholarly legal literature of the time—such as William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England, which was widely read and relied on by the founders.” Id. at 616.
38. The twelve stages of the prosecution described by Blackstone include arrest; commitment and
bail; prosecution; process upon indictment; arraignment and its incidents; plea, and issue; trial and
conviction; benefit of clergy; judgment, and its consequences; reversal of judgment; reprieve and
pardon; and execution. See Blackstone, supra note 30, at *v–vi, *289–406. McMurray notes that the
“prosecution” stage only refers to charging. McMurray, supra note 23, at 617.
39. See McMurray, supra note 23, at 617–18.
40. See id. (noting that stage nine “falls chronologically right where sentencing falls under modern
criminal procedure: between trial and appeal”).
41. See id.; see also Blackstone, supra note 30, at *375–89.
42. See Douglass, supra note 28, at 2008 (“[Pre-Founding,] a unitary trial and single jury verdict
determined not only guilt or innocence, but life or death as well. With that system as their point of
reference, they crafted a single set of adversarial rights to govern all of the proceedings that might lead
to the penalty of death.”); see also McMurray, supra note 23, at 618.
43. See Francis H. Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: A
Study in Constitutional Development 54 (1951); see also White, supra note 29, at 395 (“Sixth
Amendment rights do not begin and end with the in-court proceeding commonly known as a trial.”);
McMurray, supra note 23, at 616 (arguing that the entire process of securing the criminal judgment is the
prosecution and noting that the government will typically not dismiss other counts until after sentencing,
which supports the argument that the prosecution is not yet over until the defendant has been sentenced).
44. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced in federal district court without
45
the benefit of counsel. The Court ruled Johnson’s conviction and
sentence could not stand under the Sixth Amendment because he was
not represented by, and had not competently and intelligently waived,
46
counsel. By the late 1950s, the Court squarely rejected the trial-right47
only theory of the Counsel Clause in Moore v. Michigan. In Moore, the
Court held that counsel’s representation was not confined only to the
48
trial. Less than a decade after Moore, the Court held in Gideon v.
49
Wainwright that the Counsel Clause applied in state courts. Shortly
thereafter, the Court in Mempa v. Rhay applied the Counsel Clause to an
array of post-conviction proceedings, including sentencing, appeals, and
50
probation hearings.
Mempa remains the preeminent post-ratification case discussing the
application of the Counsel Clause at felony sentencing proceedings in
51
state and federal courts. Mempa involved unrelated convictions of two
defendants who pleaded guilty in Washington state court on the advice
52
of counsel. Both defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment
and released on probation under Washington’s deferred sentencing
53
statutes. The prosecutor moved to have the probations revoked because
54
other crimes were allegedly committed post-release. Neither defendant
was provided counsel at their probation revocation hearings, and both

45. Id. at 460.
46. Id. at 468. Much of the Court’s reasoning focused on the importance and role of counsel in felony
cases. Id. at 462–67. The Court referred to the Counsel Clause as “one of the safeguards . . . deemed
necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.” Id. at 462. Moreover, the right to be
heard would mean little if counsel were unavailable, as defendants are often in need of the “guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.” Id. at 463. The purpose of counsel is to protect
defendants from conviction and sentences resulting from their own ignorance of legal and constitutional
rights. Id. at 465. Ten years later, the Court affirmed Johnson in Townsend v. Burke, but declined to hold
that counsel was required in all cases. 334 U.S. 736, 739 (1948). Instead, the Court reasoned that the
conviction and sentence were predicated on misinformation or a misreading of court records that could
have been prevented had defendant been provided with counsel. Id. at 741.
47. 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
48. Id. at 160. Moore, a seventeen-year-old African-American youth, was charged with murdering
an elderly Caucasian woman and was sentenced to solitary confinement and hard labor for life after
confessing to the murder. Id. at 156. Moore challenged his conviction and sentence based on
Michigan’s failure to provide counsel during Moore’s plea and sentencing hearings. Id. The Court
noted that the trial judge’s inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea fulfilled the state’s constitutional
duty. Id. at 158. The Court held, however, that Moore’s case fell within the class of cases in which the
intervention of counsel was an essential element of a fair hearing. Id. at 159. The Court emphasized
that the assistance of counsel was of such critical importance as to be an element of Due Process under
the Fourteenth Amendment and that Moore had not intelligently waived counsel. Id. at 161.
49. 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963).
50. 389 U.S. 128, 136 (1967).
51. See generally id.
52. Id. at 130–33.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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55

were re-incarcerated as a result. Both defendants filed habeas petitions
56
and claimed violations of the Counsel Clause. The Court reversed the
57
Washington Supreme Court’s denial of both petitions.
Admittedly, Mempa does not answer the question whether the
Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing. But Mempa ultimately
rejected a strict trial-right-only theory of the Counsel Clause and
acknowledged that post-trial proceedings could be of a critical nature in
58
a criminal case. In doing so, the Mempa Court was not persuaded by
arguments that the revocation hearing was a mere formality or that any
violation of the Counsel Clause was remedied because defendants were
59
provided with the assistance of counsel at trial. At the revocation
hearing, counsel was necessary for marshaling and proving the facts,
60
introducing evidence, and generally aiding and assisting the defendants.
Fundamentally, the Court affirmed Gideon’s mandate of counsel at every
stage of the “criminal prosecution” that implicated procedural and
substantial rights.

II. Origin and Erosion of the Jury Trial Clause as Only a Trial
Right
The rule that the Jury Trial Clause applied solely at the trial stage of
a criminal prosecution developed simultaneously as indeterminate
sentencing lost favor as the dominant model of fixing punishment in the
United States. During the indeterminate era, broad judicial discretion
61
existed to ensure that punishment fit the offender as well as the offense.
At the height of the indeterminate era, judicial discretion was curbed
only by the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against excessive fines and

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. Additionally, the Court recognized that a number of lower courts had already ruled that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to sentencing in federal cases. Id. at 134 n.4 (citing
Nunley v. United States, 283 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1960); McKinney v. United States, 208 F.2d 844 (D.C.
Cir. 1953); Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1950)).
59. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 135.
60. Id.
61. See Douglas A. Berman, Foreword: Beyond Blakely and Booker: Pondering Modern
Sentencing Process, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 653, 654 (2005). Berman argues that the
“rehabilitative medical model” was conceived and discussed in medical terms, with offenders
described as sick and punishments aspiring to cure. Id. (citing J.L. Miller et al., Sentencing Reform:
A Review and Annotated Bibliography 1–6 (1981)). For Berman, sentencing became both
administrative, in that sentencing judges and parole officials were expected to craft individualized
sentences, and clinical, “almost like a doctor or social worker.” See Berman, supra, at 655 (citing
United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D. Mass. 2004)); see also Douglass, supra note 28,
at 2018 n.295 (describing individualized punishment as “reflecting a ‘scientific’ view that crime was a
form of sickness that might be cured with proper treatment of an individual”); Sandra Shane-DuBow
et al., Sentencing Reform in the United States: History, Content, and Effect 5–6 (1985);
McMurray, supra note 23, at 592; Hessick & Hessick, supra note 29, at 52.
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62

cruel and unusual punishment. Sentencing judges were not required to
63
seek the jury’s guidance and frequently engaged in post-trial fact finding
64
to punish within the statutory range. This contrasted sharply with preFounding determinate era felony sentencing, when judges rarely engaged
65
in post-verdict fact finding to fix punishment.
As indeterminate sentencing developed, improved means of
transportation and communication brought people closer together,
66
multiplied frictions, and required increased governmental supervision.
67
68
69
This burdened law enforcement officials, courts, and the public.
62. McMurray, supra note 23, at 592.
63. Id. (citing Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing,
39 Val. U. L. Rev. 693, 697 (2005)); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing As Democratic Practice, 89 Va.
L. Rev. 311, 316–19, 354 (2003) (noting that by 1796, one state sentenced by jury, and by 1919,
fourteen states sentenced by jury, but that by 2003, only six states sentenced by jury). But see
Douglass, supra note 28, at 2013–14 (describing the widespread practice of jury sentencing in capital
cases during the American constitutional period).
64. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 29, at 52. Hessick and Hessick noted that discretionary
schemes were originally premised on the punishment rational of rehabilitation and that judges’
assessments were based on specific sentencing characteristics with an eye toward reforming the
criminal defendant’s law breaking ways. Id. Sentencing characteristics included the defendant’s age,
prior criminal history, employment history, family ties, educational level, military service, and
charitable activities. Id.
65. McMurray, supra note 23, at 592 (noting that confrontation at sentencing was irrelevant
under the determinate model because there was no fact finding at the time the sentence was
announced and thus, no witnesses to confront). Blackstone reported that only in exceptional cases did
determinate era sentencing judges exercise discretion to impose fines or determine the length of
imprisonment. Blackstone, supra note 30, at *378. Generally, the “nature of the punishment . . .
[either] by fine or imprisonment, [was] . . . fixed and determinate: though the duration and quantity of
each must vary, from the aggravations or otherwise of the offence, the quality and condition of the
parties, and from innumerable other circumstances.” See id.; see also Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at
Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1771, 1814 n.180, 1814–25 (2003).
66. See Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1927); see also
J.C. McWhorter, Abolish the Jury, 57 Am. L. Rev. 42, 43 (1923) (opining that automobiles afforded
criminals the ability to “play hide and seek” with law enforcement).
67. Miller, supra note 66, at 19. Miller argued that inadequacies with regard to law enforcement
staff, equipment, and cohesive administrative guidance and direction made it impossible for law
enforcement “to cope successfully with the professional banditry of th[e] scientific age.” See id.; see
also Sam B. Warner & Henry B. Cabot, Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice During the
Past Fifty Years, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 583, 590, 595 (1937) (noting the large increases in petty offenses and
the recent revival of outlawry, which the author attributed to the inability of the courts and authorities
to handle modern crime); McWhorter, supra note 66, at 42 (“[T]he public mind is becoming so
accustomed to lawlessness that it is acquiring that listless indifference which long and unconcerned
familiarity begets. Unpunished crime has become a matter-of-course thing in the public mind.”).
68. See Miller, supra note 66, at 20 (noting the inadequacy of courts to accommodate their
increased burden and the irksome burden of jury duty on the public); see also Jennifer L. Mnookin,
Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in America, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1721, 1728 (2005)
(reviewing George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph: A History of Plea Bargaining in America
(2003)) (arguing that increased caseloads significantly contributed to the judiciary’s changing attitude
about the merits of negotiated pleas); Warner & Cabot, supra note 67, at 590 (noting that the number
of judges did not keep pace with the striking population growth).
69. See Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. Cal. L. Rev. 97, 106 (1928) (noting the small
minority of convictions that actually involved a jury); McWhorter, supra note 66, at 47, 51 (arguing
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Inadequacies and lack of cohesive administrative guidance made it
70
impossible to combat the “professional banditry of th[e] scientific age.”
Large increases in “outlawry” further evidenced the inability of authorities
71
to handle “modern” crime. J.C. McWhorter, an early twentieth century
legal commentator, lamented in 1923 that the public had become listlessly
72
indifferent to lawlessness because crime so often went unpunished. As
incarceration became an increasingly available form of punishment, the
public was increasingly persuaded by policy arguments in favor of
73
individualized rather than determinate sentences.
The role of counsel in criminal cases also expanded during the
74
indeterminate era, perhaps as a direct effect of the Constitution’s
adoption of an adversarial system of trial, or perhaps due to the increase
75
in criminality. Throughout the U.S. colonies, knowledgeable and
76
experienced defense bars emerged. By the mid-eighteenth century, the
acquittal rate for represented defendants in New Jersey was seventyseven percent, while the acquittal rate for unrepresented defendants was
77
merely eighteen percent. In 1834, almost a century later, virtually every
78
defendant in New York requested or received the assistance of counsel.
That counsel was available to defendants did not mean that the
adversarial system that we know today existed during the emergence of
79
indeterminate sentencing. The point here is that by the height of the
indeterminate era, the United States had developed a distinct adversarial
system. Yet few constitutionally prescribed controls limited judicial
discretion at felony sentencing, in part due to a lack of uniform sentencing
procedures and in part due to a reduced number of felony trials.
Counsel’s expanded role emerged simultaneously with two other
notable developments of post-Founding indeterminate sentencing: plea80
81
bargaining and bifurcation of trial and sentencing. Bifurcation created
that the jury has “lived out the days of . . . usefulness,” stating that it was “difficult to imagine a more
illogical and unbusiness-like way of trying cases than by a jury of twelve men selected as they are”).
70. Miller, supra note 66, at 19.
71. Warner & Cabot, supra note 67, at 590, 595.
72. McWhorter, supra note 66, at 43.
73. Douglass, supra note 28, at 2018.
74. See Miller, supra note 66, at 16–18 (noting the creation of new laws prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of liquor, regulating securities, and governing the issuances of checks and other
evidences of value, as well as new laws regulating automobiles); see also Warner & Cabot, supra note
67, at 585 (noting the increase in criminality and prosecutions).
75. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Rise of the American Adversary System: America Before England,
14 Widener L. Rev. 323, 327–28 (2009).
76. Id. at 331.
77. Id. at 330–31 (noting that by the middle of the eighteenth century, a defendant in colonial
New Jersey was roughly four times more likely to be acquitted if represented by counsel).
78. Id. at 331–32.
79. Id. at 334.
80. See Mary E. Vogel, The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the Process
of State Formation, 1830–1860, 33 Law & Soc’y Rev. 161, 161, 173 (1999) (noting the emergence of
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separate “sentencing hearings,” resulting in a distinct and separate
82
procedural phase of the criminal prosecution during which judges
83
exercised broad discretion to determine the length of imprisonment. By
necessity, this appeared to require consideration of information about
84
the defendant that was not presented during the trial. Once guilt was
entered, sentencing judges exercised virtually unlimited discretion to
85
determine the range of imprisonment.
It is difficult to pinpoint when bifurcation or guilty pleas became the
norm. Like bifurcation, evidence of guilty pleas prior to the Founding in
86
the English common law system and the U.S. colonies is rare. But by
the late 1830s, guilty pleas arose in the colonies, and ten years later, they
87
were accepted for practically every sort of offense. By mid-century, plea
88
bargaining was well institutionalized and judges were willingly involved
89
in the process. But early plea bargaining may not have been initiated by

plea bargaining during the 1830s and 1840s). The adoption of adult parole and probation services was
also an important development during the post-Founding era. See Warner & Cabot, supra note 67, at
599 (discussing the creation of reformatories for young male offenders and arguing that adoption of
the indeterminate sentencing and parole law occurred together). Warner and Cabot also noted that
the first instances of probation occurred in seventeenth century Massachusetts and that by 1910,
twenty states had adopted adult probation statutes. See id. at 598–99. Warner and Cabot indicated that
the duty of the probation officer was to furnish the judge with information about a defendant’s
criminal history. Id. at 607. While the sentencing judge decided the punishment, it was the parole
board that decided the date of release. See id. See generally Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American
Inquisition: Sentencing After the Federal Guidelines, 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 11 (2010) (discussing
early statutory history of probation in federal system).
81. See Iontcheva, supra note 63, at 314–30 (2003) (discussing origins of jury sentencing in the
United States and causes of its decline); Michaels, supra note 65, at 1814 n.180.
82. See Herman, supra note 29, at 302.
83. Douglass, supra note 28, at 2019. Douglass suggests that bifurcation was the result of the need
to separately consider information at a sentencing hearing that could not be introduced at trial. Id. at
2018–19 (arguing that the rules of evidence conflicted with the emerging preference for making
punishment fit not only the crime, but also the individual criminal because evidence relating to bad
character was considered unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible at trial).
84. Id. at 2018 (noting the new goal of individualized sentences and arguing that if indeterminate
era “judges were to tailor their sentences to fit individual offenders, they needed to know more about
that individual than a trial—or guilty plea—was likely to tell them”).
85. Warner & Cabot, supra note 67, at 606–07.
86. See Vogel, supra note 80, at 161, 173.
87. See id. at 175 (demonstrating surge in guilty pleas in Boston from less than 15% in 1830, to
28.6% in 1840, 52% in 1850, 55.6% in 1860, and 88% in 1880). Vogel argued that plea bargaining rose
as part of a “process of political stabilization,” as part of an “effort to legitimate institutions of selfrule,” and as part of an imposition of “social control in a way that avoided any delegitimizing use of
force.” Id. at 161, 227.
88. See id. at 174–75 (discussing plea bargaining in nineteenth century Boston).
89. Miller, supra note 66, at 2. Miller argued that the concept of forgiveness by an aggrieved
person, which he described as “condonation,” was long recognized by 1927, but had no effect in
preventing prosecution. Id. “In practice, however, the condonation and compromise of criminal cases
[was] frequent and the methods of evading the clear purpose of the written law [were] varied.” See id.;
see also Moley, supra note 69, at 107, 118 (noting generational increase in the proportion of guilty
pleas). Moley notes that by 1926 in Cook County, Illinois, 13,117 felony prosecutions entered
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the same parties as it is today. Some indeterminate era judges openly
90
bargained with the defendant in court while others refused to participate
91
in negotiations between the parties. Judges who participated in pleas
could have also privately expressed to the parties the propriety of a
92
settlement.
Critics of indeterminate sentencing initially questioned the lack of
procedural and substantive rules governing the bifurcated sentencing
93
94
hearings —and to a lesser extent, guilty pleas. The Honorable Marvin
95
E. Frankel, widely considered the father of modern sentencing reform,
lamented wide disparities in punishment, which substantively turned
“arbitrarily upon the variegated passions and prejudices of individual
96
97
judges.” Judge Frankel also noted the absence of procedural rules and
the limited role of appellate courts, which had authority to review

preliminary hearing and 492 resulted in a complete jury trial; during the same year in Chicago, slightly
more than one percent of cases initiated as felonies resulted in a jury verdict of guilty on the felony
charge. Id. There also appeared to be an increase in jury trial waivers, presumably in favor of bench
trials. See Warner & Cabot, supra note 67, at 592 (noting that in the late nineteenth century waiver of
jury trial in criminal cases was common in few states, but that by 1937 it was “permitted by
constitution, statute or judicial decision in the federal courts and those of over half the states”). These
sources do not specify whether the remaining cases were resolved by dismissals, guilty pleas, or bench
trials.
90. See id.; see also Moley, supra note 69, at 103 (describing the early use of guilty pleas as a
defense strategy that also had advantages for prosecutors, who would not be “compelled to carry
through an onerous and protracted trial,” and judges, who “escape[] the danger of being reversed on
some point of law”).
91. Miller, supra note 66, at 8, 10. Cases in which pleas were commonly used included violation of
liquor laws; automobile thefts; desertion or failure to provide for wife or children; sex cases, including
seduction and statutory rape; and larceny or accusations for issuing fraudulent checks or obtaining
money or property by fraudulent means. Id. at 12–16.
92. Id. at 10.
93. See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 5, 7–8, (1972); see also
United States v. Clark, 792 F. Supp. 637, 650 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (citing Sentencing Comm’n,
Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines 3 n.15 (1987)); Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Due Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 243, 243 (2001) (noting that
the absence of standards that governed criminal sentencing in the indeterminate era adduced an
arbitrariness that was compounded by the absence of rules of evidence and standards of proof).
94. See Klein, supra note 63, at 699 (noting decline of indeterminate model in the early 1970s); see
also Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern
Sentencing Reforms, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 277, 279 (2005); Berman, supra note 9, at 393.
95. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Marvin Frankel, Federal Judge and Pioneer of Sentencing
Guidelines, Dies at 81, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2002, at C15 (describing Frankel as a “legal scholar whose
views helped to establish sentencing guidelines for federal courts”). This Article refers to the federal
sentencing guidelines as “the Guidelines.”
96. Frankel, supra note 93, at 5, 7–8; Berman, supra note 61, at 655 (noting that some outcomes
and disparities could be attributed to race, gender, and socioeconomic status).
97. Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration, 101 Yale L.J.
2043, 2044 (1992) (noting common use of information at sentencing that had not been cross-examined
or otherwise exposed to adversarial or independent scrutiny).
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98

sentences only on rare or extraordinary grounds. He pondered whether
99
rehabilitative goals were necessary and realistic and noted that judges
and probation officers rarely communicated about a defendant or his
100
“treatment.” Finally, Judge Frankel described the trial court’s physical
observations of the defendant as a minor and fleeting factor at best, and
101
at worst—overdrawn and overweighed judicial folklore.
Critique of the lack of procedural and substantive criminal
102
sentencing rules was partially addressed in In re Winship, Mullaney v.
103
104
Wilbur, and Patterson v. New York. Winship dubbed the reasonable
105
doubt standard a protectant of the presumption of innocence and
106
established that every fact necessary to constitute the charged offense
107
must be proven by that standard. Winship remained silent on how to

98. Frankel, supra note 93, at 5, 7, 23–24. Frankel points out that unless there was an egregious
departure from the law, indeterminate era sentences were unreviewable “if within the commonly
extravagant bounds of the statute.” See id. at 23; see also Saltzburg, supra note 93, at 244 (noting that
sentences in the indeterminate era, whether imposed by judges or by juries, were “largely uncontrolled
by appellate review”).
99. See Frankel, supra note 93, at 29–31; see also Berman, supra note 94, at 279.
100. Frankel, supra note 93, at 10–12; id. at 37–38 (describing “poor performance record” of
probation office). Frankel also questioned the common practice of separating questions of guilt from
punishment. Id. at 5.
101. Id. at 27.
102. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
103. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
104. 432 U.S. 197, 205–07 (1977).
105. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
106. Id. at 358–59. Section 712 of the New York Family Court Act defined a juvenile delinquent as
“a person over seven and less than sixteen years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult,
would constitute a crime.” Id. at 359. Winship, who was less than sixteen years of age, allegedly
entered a locker and stole $112 from a woman’s pocket book. Id. at 359–60. Section 744(b) of the New
York Family Code required that “[a]ny determination at the conclusion of [an adjudicatory] hearing
that a [juvenile] did act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 360.
Winship’s eighteen-month sentence was subject to annual extensions until his eighteenth birthday, for
a total of six years. Id. at 359–60. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed
without opinion. See id. at 360; see also In re Samuel W., 247 N.E.2d 253, 254 (N.Y. 1969). According
to the New York Court of Appeals, a lawyer’s duty in a criminal case was to see her client acquitted,
the charges reduced, or the punishment minimized. Id. at 255. In a juvenile proceeding, the lawyer’s
duty is to do what is in the best interest of the child. Id. at 255–56. Findings of guilt in juvenile
adjudications were not convictions that affected rights or privileges and thus enjoyed the protective
cover of confidentiality. Id. Because delinquency status was not a crime and juvenile proceedings were
not criminal, there was no deprivation of due process. Id. at 257–58. According to the New York
courts, equal protection arguments failed because juvenile proceedings were distinguishable from
criminal prosecutions. Id.
107. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. According to the Court, the requirement of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt dated at least to the Founding and was long assumed to be constitutionally required
in criminal cases. Id. at 360, 362. But see id. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting) (doubting whether guilt by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was expressly or impliedly commanded in the Constitution). At the
Founding, guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required in both delinquency proceeding
against juveniles and criminal proceedings against adults. Id. at 367–68. But see id. at 386 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]hen, as here, a State through its duly constituted legislative branch decides to apply a
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determine which facts were necessary to prove the charge. A narrow
approach was chosen in Mullaney, which only required proof beyond
109
reasonable doubt of the “elements of the offense.” Two years later,
Patterson excluded affirmative defenses from the category of facts that
110
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Less than a decade after Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson, the
federal government and the states heeded calls for limited judicial
discretion at criminal sentencing and for structured criminal procedural
111
The
rules that provided tougher appellate review of sentences.
Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) was passed in 1984 and would provide
112
the blueprint for felony sentencing rules in federal courts. The SRA
created the United States Sentencing Commission (“Commission”),
which was tasked with drafting the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
113
(“Guidelines”). The Guidelines rejected rehabilitation as the central
principle for structured sentencing and expressly called for sentences to
114
provide “just punishment.” The Guidelines also calculated punishment

different standard, then that standard, unless it is otherwise unconstitutional, must be applied to insure
that persons are treated according to the ‘law of the land.’”).
108. See id. at 364; see also Ronald J. Allen et al., From Winship to Apprendi to Booker:
Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 195, 202 (2005). See generally
Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas,
110 Yale L.J. 1097, 1103 (2001); Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to the Future: Does Apprendi Bar a
Legislature’s Power to Shift the Burden of Proof away from the Prosecution by Labeling an Element of
a Traditional Crime As an Affirmative Defense?, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1351, 1357 (2003).
109. In Mullaney, the Court interpreted a Maine law that defined murder as an unlawful killing
with malice aforethought, which was presumed; a killing without malice aforethought was
manslaughter. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 686 n.3 (1975) (quoting Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17,
§ 2651 (1964)). Maine argued that defendants had the burden to prove heat of passion, which would
qualify the killing as manslaughter. Id. at 699. The Court reasoned that Winship was not limited to
“elements” as defined by state law and held that the prosecution has the burden to prove heat of
passion beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
110. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205–08 (1977) (distinguishing between affirmative
defenses and statutory elements and reasoning that affirmative defenses do not allow the state to
presume or infer any facts against defendants); see also Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The
Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 446, 462–63 (1985)
(characterizing tension between Mullaney and Patterson as “a dispute over how to delineate the limits
of a state’s power to define the ‘essential facts’ of a crime”). Additionally, there was no constitutional
presumption of innocence at sentencing. Michaels, supra note 65, at 1778. See generally Mark D. Knoll
& Richard G. Singer, Searching for the “Tail of the Dog”: Finding “Elements” of Crimes in the Wake of
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1057, 1081 (1999) (“Patterson opened the door for
creative legislatures to evade the fundamental protections afforded in Winship by carefully drafting
their statutes.”).
111. Berman, supra note 9, at 394; Frankel, supra note 93, at 54.
112. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended
at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
113. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (1988); see also Saltzburg, supra note 93, at 243 n.2.
114. Berman, supra note 94, at 280; see Kyron Huigens, Panel Two: Considerations at Sentencing—
What Factors Are Relevant and Who Should Decide? Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 Colum. L. Rev.
1048, 1052 (2005) (discussing policy arguments for discretionary and guidelines sentencing).
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by assigning points to specific facts about the offender and offense. The
Guidelines were mandatory: sentencing courts were required to explain
117
the basis for departures from the applicable range of punishment and
118
appellate courts were granted increased authority to review sentences.
Two years after the SRA was enacted, the Supreme Court tested
119
Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act (“MMSA”) in
McMillan v. Pennsylvania. The MMSA imposed a minimum sentence of
five years for offenses committed while in “visible possession” of a
120
firearm. The MMSA did not require visible possession to be proven to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before application of the five-year
121
Instead, the MMSA permitted Pennsylvania
minimum sentence.
sentencing judges to consider evidence already introduced at trial as well
as evidence produced for the first time at the sentencing hearing, all of
which would be judged by the court by a preponderance of the
122
evidence. If the prosecution established that the underlying offense
involved visible possession of a firearm, the MMSA divested sentencing
123
judges of discretion to impose a sentence of less than five years.
Presumably, sentences in excess of the statutory maximum were also not
124
authorized. Four Pennsylvania sentencing judges refused to apply the
125
MMSA because it did not allow the jury to evaluate visible possession.
126
The Court coined the term “sentencing enhancement,” which was
distinguishable from an “offense element,” and held that state legislatures
127
had authority to designate certain facts as “enhancements.”

115. Breyer, supra note 113, at 7–8. Categories and sentence length were determined by an
analysis of 10,000 actual cases. See id. at 7; see also Becker, supra note 7, at 7–8.
116. See Breyer, supra note 113, at 5; see also Bascuas, supra note 80, at 8–9 (discussing
methodology of the Guidelines); Becker, supra note 7, at 7–8 (same).
117. See Breyer, supra note 113, at 5; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal
Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 33, 93 (2003).
118. Breyer, supra note 113, at 5–6; see Bascuas, supra note 80, at 28 (discussing standard of review
under the Guidelines).
119. Breyer, supra note 113, at 3; Berman, supra note 9, at 394.
120. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 80 (1986).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 82–84.
126. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 500 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“McMillan . . .
spawned a special sort of fact known as a sentencing enhancement.”); Knoll & Singer, supra note 110,
at 1058 (describing McMillan as marking the “birth of the ‘sentencing factor’”); Jeffrey L. Fisher,
Originalism as an Anchor for the Sixth Amendment, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 53, 62 (2011) (defining
a sentencing factor as a particular fact that the legislature determined should subject the defendant to
an increased sentence).
127. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85–86. According to the Court, the MMSA did not disregard the
presumption of innocence; in fact, it created no presumptions. Id. at 86–87. Nor did the MMSA relieve
the prosecution of its burden. Id. at 87. The MMSA did not alter the maximum penalty for the crime
committed or create a separate offense calling for a separate penalty. Id. at 87–88. Finally, the MMSA
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McMillan established the element/enhancement distinction as the
128
constitutional limit to legislative authority but allowed state legislatures
129
to designate which facts were elements or enhancements. By the
130
millennium, Jones v. United States limited McMillan to require Congress
and state legislatures to include traditional elements in the definition of
131
132
crimes. The next year, in Castillo v. United States, the Court appeared
to provide a framework to distinguish between traditional elements and
133
sentencing enhancements. Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder
federal officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which prohibited the
134
use or carrying of a “firearm” in relation to a crime of violence. Penalties
135
increased dramatically when the firearm was a machine gun. The Court
held that the “machine gun” finding constituted an element of a separate
136
offense.
Castillo found type of firearm an offense element despite the fact
137
that Congress designated it a sentencing enhancement. In so holding,
the Castillo Court did little to calm the escalating tension between the
Jury Trial Clause and McMillan’s broad grant of legislative authority to
choose between elements and enhancements. The Court’s internal

did not change the definition of any existing offense. See id. at 88–90; see also Bibas, supra note 108, at
1106 (detailing factors for the Apprendi Court’s finding that the sentencing enhancements were
constitutional).
128. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85–88.
129. See id. at 85 (“[I]t is normally ‘within the power of the state to regulate procedures under
which its laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of
persuasion.’”) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977)); see also Berman, supra
note 9, at 399.
130. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). Jones was convicted of violating the federal
carjacking statute which carries a maximum fifteen-year sentence, unless serious bodily injury or death
occurs. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119(1)–(3) (1999). A twenty-five year imprisonment was imposed based on the
finding at sentencing that serious bodily injury resulted. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230–31.
131. Id. at 231–44. The Court held that section 2119 defined three separate offenses that each must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 231–39. The Court warned that its holding rested on rules
of statutory interpretation rather than the Constitution. See id. at 252 n.11; see also Andrew M. Levine,
The Confounding Boundaries of ‘Apprendi-Land’: Statutory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 29 Am. J. Crim. L. 377, 398 (2002).
132. Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000).
133. Id. at 124–31.
134. Id. at 122.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 121.
137. Id. at 124. The Castillo Court made five specific findings to support its holding that firearm type
was an offense element. First, the statute listed the basic offense elements in the first sentence and the
sentencing enhancements in the remaining subsequent sentences. Id. at 124–25. Second, the type of
firearm had not typically or traditionally been a sentencing factor because it neither involved
characteristics of the offender nor special features the offense. Id. at 126–27. Third, to ask a jury, rather
than the judge, to determine the type of firearm would rarely complicate trial or result in unfairness. Id. at
127–28. Fourth, the legislative history did not support interpreting section 924(c) as setting forth
sentencing factors. Id. at 129–30. Finally, the twenty-five year increase attached to the machine gun
finding was extreme, which weighed in favor of treating firearm type as an element. Id. at 131.
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debate focused on procedural and substantive characteristics of felony
138
sentencing at the time of the Founding. A slight majority had come to
139
understand that pre-Founding a pre-determined sentence resulted once
140
the jury found guilt. This majority believed that the Sixth Amendment’s
text and structure reflected pre-Founding determinate jury sentencing in
141
felony cases.
On the day Castillo ruled that type of firearm was an element under
section 924(c), Apprendi v. New Jersey overturned a sentence that was
142
also based, in part, on post-verdict judicial fact finding. Apprendi was
convicted under a New Jersey statute that classified unlawful possession of
143
a firearm a second-degree offense. Punishment for unlawful possession
144
of a firearm ranged from five to ten years. Under a separate statute,
New Jersey extended the term of imprisonment for unlawful possession
145
while committing a racially motivated crime. The racial motive—or
“hate crime” enhancement—did not require a jury, could be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, and increased punishment to a range of

138. See generally Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of Reasonable Doubt Rule,
75 Calif. L. Rev. 1665, 1701 (1987); Herman, supra note 29, at 323–25, 328, 344; Knoll & Singer, supra
note 110, at 1061–62, 1067–68, 1078–79 (discussing historical difference between an “offense” and its
“elements,” as well as “elements” and “facts looked to by a judge to determine the sentence”).
139. See Douglass, supra note 28, at 2011 (citing Whitnan J. Hou, Capital Retrials and
Resentencing: Whether to Appeal and Resentencing Fairness, 16 Cap. Def. J. 19, 30 (2003)); see also
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976) (citing Hugo A. Bedau, The Death Penalty in
America 5–6, 15, 27–28 (rev. ed. 1967)) (“At the time the [Bill of Rights] was adopted in 1791, the
States uniformly followed the common-law practice of making death the exclusive and mandatory
sentence for certain specified offenses.”). Death could be accomplished by hanging, embowelment,
and burying alive. Blackstone, supra note 30, at *376–77. By no means was death the exclusive
punishment for felonies, merely the most common. See id. at *377. Other punishment included
deprivation of sensation by strangling, mutilation or dismembering, slitting of the nostrils, branding of
the hand, whipping, hard labor, exile, banishment, loss of liberty, and temporary imprisonment. Id.
Despite these myriad of options, Blackstone makes clear that the quantity or degree of punishment
was “ascertained for every offence[,] and that it [wa]s not left in the breast of any judge, nor even of a
jury, to alter that judgment.” Id. Blackstone warned that “if judgments were to be the private opinions
of the judge, men would then be slaves to their magistrates[,] and would live in society without
knowing exactly the conditions and obligations which it lays them under.” Id.
140. White, supra note 29, at 396 (describing the modern day trial as involving a bifurcated process
by which there is a finding of guilt or innocence by a jury and a subsequent determination of
punishment by a judge); Douglass, supra note 28, at 1968 (describing the trial world as a highly
structured and elaborate body of precedent that defines substantive rights, but describing the
sentencing world as an informal, free-flowing kind of place that has with few hard rules). According to
Douglass, “few ‘trial rights’ survive intact after a guilty verdict.” Id.
141. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 29, at 51 (noting that determinate sentencing schemes
“presented no occasion to consider the extent to which constitutional protections should be treated
differently at sentencing than at trial”). But see Fenner, supra note 21, at 37; Nancy J. King & Susan R.
Klein, Essential Elements, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1467, 1507–08 (2001).
142. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468–90 (2000); see also Michaels, supra note 65, at
1814 n.180.
143. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 468–69.
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ten to twenty years. Apprendi pleaded guilty to unlawful possession
147
and was never charged with any type of hate crime. The judge imposed
a twelve-year sentence based on the court’s own finding at sentencing
148
that Apprendi’s acts were racially motivated. The New Jersey Supreme
Court, relying on McMillan, affirmed and held that motivation was a
149
traditional sentencing factor.
The Apprendi Court examined the adequacy of New Jersey’s
sentencing procedure and qualified McMillan’s longstanding deference
to legislative choice between elements and enhancements. The Court
reasoned that the right to a jury determination of guilt of every element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt was a historical foundation of
150
the common law. The Court reflected on criminal prosecutions at time
of the Founding and the lack of judicial discretion because of sanction151
specific criminal laws. During the Founding, guilt and punishment were
invariably linked and there was no distinction between an element and
152
an enhancement. In the Court’s view, even though the practice of
unitary trial and sentencing may have changed, modern courts must still
153
“adhere to the basic principle[s].” Because the jury trial right was one
154
of surpassing importance in the common law, there was no “principled
155
basis for treating [enhancements and elements] differently.” Guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt was designated a historically significant
156
companion right to a jury verdict. Both reflected “a profound judgment
about the way in which law should be enforced and justice
157
administered.”
Apprendi also limited McMillan to the extent that designating certain
158
159
facts as elements rather than enhancements could thwart Winship. To
combat attempts to circumvent Winship, Apprendi embraced a principle

146. Id.
147. Id. at 469.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 471–74.
150. Id. at 477 (citing Blackstone, supra note 30, at *343).
151. Id. at 479 (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 485.
153. Id. at 483–84 (emphasis added). But see id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing
Apprendi not as a sharp break from the past, but a reflection of the Sixth Amendment’s original
meaning).
154. Id. at 476.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 478.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 485; see also Knoll & Singer, supra note 110, at 1114, 1118 (declaring “Winship lives
again”).
159. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484–86, 487 n.13 (“[I]t [was] unconstitutional for a legislature to
remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties.”); see also
Fisher, supra note 126, at 56 (concluding that the firearm enhancement was a classic example of an
aggravated crime, and describing Apprendi as a very easy case).
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160

that was foreshadowed a year earlier : “any fact [other than a prior
conviction] that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
161
reasonable doubt.” By its terms, Apprendi applied only when postverdict judicial fact finding involved imposition of a sentence more
162
severe than the statutory maximum. The Court ruled that the hate
crime enhancement required a jury determination of guilt beyond a
163
reasonable doubt without reference to Castillo.
A broad reading of Apprendi seemed to require a jury determination
of all facts that would increase punishment, which would fundamentally
implicate structured sentencing schemes like the Guidelines. At least one
member of the Apprendi majority rejected this view; one dissenter foresaw
164
the threat. Arguments that McMillian authorized legislatures—not
sentencing commissions—to choose between elements and enhancements
165
strengthened after Apprendi. The Guidelines and other structured
sentencing schemes were alleged to have eliminated judicial discretion too
166
167
much, which in turn lead to increased prosecutorial authority and
160. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999).
161. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; see also Knoll & Singer, supra note 110, at 1114 (“The big news
in Jones, however, is that the Court all but adopted a Constitutional rule, based on the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right, precluding the designation as a sentencing factor any item that would
significantly increase the sentence.”).
162. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13; see also Levine, supra note 131, at 405.
163. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475–76 (“The question whether [Mr.] Apprendi had a constitutional
right to have a jury find such bias on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is starkly
presented.” (emphasis added)).
164. Compare Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n.11 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[i]t is likewise
unnecessary to consider whether . . . the rule regarding elements applies to the . . . Guidelines”), with
id. at 551–52 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning whether after Apprendi, state and federal courts
should continue to assume the constitutionality of structured sentencing schemes like the Guidelines);
see also Alex Ricciardulli, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Surprise Ruling on Sentence Enhancements, L.A.
Law., Feb. 2001, at 15 (noting that “[s]eldom has so big a case [Apprendi] received so little attention”
and predicting the Guidelines did not implicate Apprendi unless a sentence greater than the maximum
authorized by statute was imposed). Ricciardulli explains that the Guidelines and other structured
sentencing laws merely allow increases in sentences within the statutory range and that such increases
fall within Apprendi’s limiting principle. Id. at 16. “Laws that allow increases beyond a range, on the
other hand, are in trouble.” See id.; see also Herman, supra note 29, at 296–97, 336–38, 344–45
(questioning the applicability of McMillan to the issue of the constitutionality of the Guidelines).
165. Herman, supra note 29, at 337–38, 344–45.
166. See, e.g., Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the
Federal Courts 78–103 (1998) (arguing against limiting sentencing discretion); Michael Tonry,
Mandatory Minimum Penalties and the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s ‘Mandatory Guidelines’, 4 Fed.
Sent’g Rep. 129, 132, 133 n.12 (1991) (identifying lack of judicial discretion as a common complaint
with the Guidelines).
167. See Saltzburg, supra note 93, at 248, 248 n.19, 251; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of
Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901, 926 (1991) (arguing that
prosecutors wield too much discretion under guidelines); Bradford C. Mank, Rewarding Defendant
Cooperation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Judges vs. Prosecutors, 26 Crim. L. Bull. 399,
402–04 (1990) (discussing issues resulting from increased prosecutorial discretion); Bascuas, supra note
80, at 12–13 (comparing shift in role of probation officer as social worker to guidelines range
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168

harsher punishment. Apprendi supported arguments that structured
169
and that McMillian’s
sentencing was a “trial-like enterprise”
170
elements/enhancement distinction violated the Jury Trial Clause.
Notable critic of structured sentencing, Professor Douglas Berman,
argued that the Guidelines failed to provide comprehensive substantive
171
and procedural constitutional protections.
Notwithstanding critique of the Guidelines by Berman and others, a
plurality of the Court affirmed McMillan’s elements/enhancements
172
distinction in Harris v. United States. Harris involved whether 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A) defines a single crime, to which brandishing is a
sentencing factor that may be considered by a judge after the trial, or
multiple crimes, to which brandishing is an essential element that must
173
be proved to a jury. Section 924(c)(1)(A)—as amended since Castillo—
provides in relevant part:
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to
the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of
174
imprisonment of not less than 10 years.

In the indictment, the government neither alleged brandishing nor
175
referenced subsection (ii). Instead, the indictment charged that Harris
computator; also discussing change in presentence report from an instrument of potential mercy and
mitigation to an instrument of inquisition and punishment).
168. See Barkow, supra note 117, at 85–87 (arguing that the Guidelines allowed little room to bend the
law as a matter of justice or equity); see also Klein, supra note 63, at 708; Bascuas, supra note 80, at 37–38.
169. See Berman, supra note 94, at 285; Berman, supra note 9, at 396–97; see also Mark
Chenoweth, Using Its Sixth Sense: The Roberts Court Revamps the Rights of the Accused, 2009 Cato
Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 239–40 (discussing Apprendi and concluding that removal of basic fact finding from
juries violated jury trial rights); Huigens, supra note 114, at 1062, 1069–73 (distinguishing between
indeterminate and guidelines sentencing, and noting the latter treats “sentencing like an exercise in
the definition and adjudication of offense elements, so that the sentencing process more and more
resembles the trial process”).
170. Barkow, supra note 117, at 109–12 (arguing that the Guidelines linked facts with punishment
and that such factual determinations were traditionally made by juries); Berman, supra note 94, at 286
(“Twentieth century . . . sentencing regimes . . . changed the landscape and have appropriately raised
Sixth Amendment concerns.”).
171. See Berman, supra note 61, at 659–60, 672 (discussing the Guidelines’ lack of procedural
rules); see also Stith & Cabranes, supra note 166, at 154; Herman, supra note 29, at 315; Thomas W.
Hutchinson et al., Federal Sentencing Law and Practice § 6A1.3 (1998).
172. 536 U.S. 545, 550, 560–61, 568–69 (2002) (reaffirming McMillan and holding that judicial
factfinding necessary to trigger mandatory minimum penalty does not implicate the Jury Trial Clause).
173. Id. at 549–50.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012).
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knowingly carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
176
177
crime. Harris was sentenced to seven years based on the finding at
178
the sentencing hearing that he brandished a firearm. The Fourth
Circuit ruled brandishing a sentencing factor, as had every other federal
179
180
circuit court to address the question. The plurality agreed.
The Harris plurality grounded itself on McMillan’s broad grant of
legislative authority to determine which facts were offense elements and
181
The Harris plurality
which facts were sentencing enhancements.
acknowledged that section 924(c)(1)(A) did not explicitly designate
brandishing as an element or sentencing factor, but offered two competing
interpretations of the statute. Either section 924(c)(1)(A) was structured
like most federal statutes, which listed the offense elements in a single
182
sentence and the separate sentencing factors into subsections. Or
alternatively, Section 924(c)(1)(A) was a statute that appeared to list all
offense elements in a single sentence but was nevertheless interpreted as
183
setting out the elements of multiple offenses. The plurality identified two
“critical textual clues” to distinguish between its two interpretations. First,
184
historically Congress had not treated brandishing as an offense element.
185
Second, the two-year increase for brandishing was insignificant.
Harris also distinguished McMillian-type facts that increased the
mandatory minimum sentence from Apprendi-type facts that increased
186
the mandatory maximum sentence. The plurality denied that there was
a fundamental inconsistency between Apprendi and McMillian/Harris.
The Framers would have considered an Apprendi fact an element of an
187
aggravated offense and thus the domain of the jury. Facts that trigger a
mandatory minimum sentence, like those at issue in McMillian and
Harris, cannot claim the same because the jury’s verdict would have
authorized imposition of the minimum punishment with or without the

175. Id. at 551.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 552–53 (designating brandishing a sentencing factor); see also United States v. Barton,
257 F.3d 433, 443 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Carlson, 217 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Pounds, 230 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2000).
180. Harris, 536 U.S. at 552–53.
181. Id. at 552–56.
182. Id. at 552–53.
183. Id. at 553–54.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 554–55. The two-year increase was described as “consistent with traditional
understandings about how sentencing factors operate” and “precisely what one would expect to see in
provisions meant to identify matters for the sentencing judge’s consideration.” Id. at 546, 554.
186. Id. at 557–58.
187. Id. at 557.
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188

finding. Judicial fact finding in the course of selecting a sentence outside
189
the authorized maximum range implicates the Sixth Amendment. As
even Apprendi acknowledges (albeit in a footnote), only increases in the
190
penalty above what the law provides function like traditional elements.
Thus, only “those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence . . . are
191
elements of the crime for the purposes of the constitutional analysis.”
Despite Harris, the Court declared that Apprendi applied more
broadly to state and federal sentencing guidelines. In Blakely v.
Washington, the Court invalidated a thirty-seven month enhancement
imposed under state sentencing guidelines for “deliberate cruelty” on the
192
grounds that the determination was not made by a jury. The next year
193
the Court considered whether the Guidelines were unconstitutional. In
United States v. Booker, and its companion case United States v. Fanfan,
defendants received sentencing enhancements in federal court based on
194
amounts of drugs, role in the offense, and obstruction of justice.
In separate majority opinions, the Court ruled that the Guidelines
195
violated the Apprendi rule, but not fatally so. The first Booker majority
concluded that a jury determination of facts that raised the sentencing
ceiling was constitutionally protected as a firmly rooted basic precept of

188. Id.
189. Id. at 558.
190. Id. at 562–64 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 n.13 (2000) (“We do not
overrule McMillan. We limit its holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more
severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury’s verdict.”)).
191. Harris, 536 U.S. at 567.
192. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Washington’s scheme permitted departures from the guidelines minimum
up to the statutory maximum based on mitigating or aggravating circumstances found by a sentencing
judge. Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at CrossPurposes, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1082, 1086–89 (2005). All departures must be justified in writing and
must be found by a preponderance. Id. The Blakely Court reasoned that the relevant “statutory
maximum” for Apprendi purposes was not the maximum sentence after finding additional facts, but
the maximum without additional facts. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. Because the additional facts were
essential to punishment, they must be found by a jury. Id. at 303–04. The Blakely Court expressly
declined an invitation to determine whether its ruling implicated the Guidelines. Id. at 305 n.9, 313
(“The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on them.”). See generally
Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30 Cardozo L. Rev.
775, 785 (2008) (discussing state sentencing models and noting a slight majority of states, twenty-nine,
were unaffected by Blakely or Booker); Fisher, supra note 126, at 56–57 (discussing legal basis for
argument that Washington’s sentencing guidelines undermined the Framers’ design); Klein, supra note
63, at 709–12; Berman, supra note 61, at 674.
193. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
194. Booker received enhancements for obstructing justice and possession of an additional 566 grams
of crack. Id. at 226–28. Fanfan’s jury found 500 or more grams of cocaine were involved. Id. at 228–29.
The sentencing court found Fanfan responsible for 2.5 kilograms of cocaine powder and 261.6 grams of
crack. Id. Fanfan was also found to have played a leadership role in the criminal activity. Id.
195. See id. at 244–45, 258–62; see also Timothy Lynch, One Cheer for United States v. Booker,
2005 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 215, 216 (describing the Booker oral argument as a direct reflection of the Court’s
unreadiness to “untangle the knots that presently encumber[ed] the constitutional right to trial by jury”).
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196

the common law. This majority distinguished between mandatory and
advisory sentencing models for Sixth Amendment purposes. Mandatory
197
guidelines implicated the Jury Trial Clause —advisory guidelines did
198
not. The first Booker majority agreed with Blakely that the statutory
maximum for Apprendi purposes was “the maximum sentence a judge
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
199
admitted by the defendant.” The Jury Trial Clause was violated to the
extent that the Guidelines required judicial fact finding at sentencing
hearings. The second Booker majority focused on whether the
200
Guidelines could be remedied. Exercising its power of severability, the
Court ruled that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines made them
201
incompatible with the U.S. Constitution. Advisory guidelines and a
reasonableness standard of appellate
review cured these
202
incompatibilities. The Court reinforced the Apprendi rule during the
203
2012 term in Southern Union Company v. United States by holding that
204
the Jury Trial Clause applied to criminal fines.
In 2013, the Court reconsidered the Harris plurality’s distinction
between mandatory minimum and maximum sentences in Alleyne v.
205
United States. Alleyne involved the same federal criminal statute at
issue in Harris, section 924(c)(1)(A), and asked the same question as
Harris, whether brandishing under subsection (ii) was an essential
206
element or a sentencing enhancement. Alleyne was convicted of one
count of robbery affecting interstate commerce and one count of using or
207
carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. Alleyne was also charged
208
with brandishing a firearm under subsection (ii) but the jury did not
196. Booker, 543 U.S. at 230.
197. Id. at 233 (reasoning that if the federal Guidelines were advisory, there would be no Sixth
Amendment implications).
198. Id. at 233 (“[W]hen a judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence . . . the
defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”).
199. Id. at 232 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004)).
200. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244–45.
201. Id. at 258.
202. Id. at 261–63.
203. 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012).
204. Id. at 2348–49. Southern Union Company involved the imposition of a $38.1 million fine under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (the “RCRA”), which set a maximum fine of
$50,000 per day of violation. Id. At the sentencing, the district court found that Southern Union violated
the RCRA for 762 days; the jury was not asked to determine the precise duration of the violation. Id. at
2349. The First Circuit ruled Apprendi did not apply to criminal fines, creating a split among the circuits.
Id. (citing United States v. Pfaff, 619 F.3d 172 (2nd Cir. 2010) (per curiam); United States v. LaGrou
Distribution Sys., Inc., 466 F.3d 585 (7th Cir. 2006)). The Court disagreed and held there was no
principled basis rooted in longstanding common law practice to treat criminal fines differently than other
forms of punishment where Apprendi applies. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2350–57.
205. 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2155–56.
208. Id.
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find Alleyne guilty of that offense. At sentencing, the district court
imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of seven years based on the
finding that by a preponderance of the evidence Alleyne could have
210
reasonably foreseen that his accomplice would brandish a firearm. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the post-verdict finding that brandishing
211
occurred.
The Alleyne Court ruled that Apprendi encompassed “not only facts
212
that increase the ceiling, but also those that increase the floor.” Alleyne
is premised on the “clear” relationship at common law between crime and
213
punishment. Additionally, in the common law substantive criminal law
tended to be sanction specific. In other words, a particular sentence was
214
prescribed for a particular offense. Alleyne reasoned that at common
law the “legally prescribed” penalty affixed to the crime included both
215
ends of the punishment range. It followed that any fact that triggered
both the mandatory (or statutory) maximum and minimum sentence
216
were “ingredient[s]” of the offense. Elevating the low-end or “floor” of
a sentencing range heightened “the loss of liberty associated with the
217
218
crime” and is as relevant as the high-end or “ceiling.” Apprendi’s
foundation is to ensure that a defendant can “predict the legally
219
applicable penalty from the face of the indictment.” In the Alleyne
Court’s view, expanding Apprendi to include facts necessary to increase
220
the mandatory minimum sentence allows a defendant to do so.
Alleyne acknowledges that judicial fact finding at felony sentencing
221
is a post-Founding development. At the time of the Founding, little
judicial discretion existed to influence felony punishment. Offense
conduct that merited punishment was determined during the trial and
sentencing only consisted of announcing the judgment. Modern
bifurcation of the trial and sentencing stages of the criminal prosecution
has shifted fact finding on offense conduct (and to a lesser extent
offender characteristics) into a structured sentencing hearing. Once guilt
is accepted (either as a result of a trial or a plea), sentencing becomes the

209. Id.
210. Id. at 2156.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2158.
213. Id.
214. See id.; see also John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French
Revolution, in The Trial Jury in England, France, Germany 1700–1900, at 36 (Antonio Padoa
Schioppa ed., 1987).
215. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160.
216. Id. at 2160–61.
217. Id. at 2161.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2163–64.
221. Id. at 2173 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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focus of all parties. Mempa establishes felony sentencing as a critical stage
of the criminal prosecution for which counsel is necessary. Apprendi and
its progeny, as most recently demonstrated in Alleyne, establish that the
jury’s fact finding role also extends beyond the trial stage of the criminal
prosecution.

III. Unbranding the Confrontation Clause as Only a Trial
Right
This Part proposes uniform application at felony sentencing of the
Sixth Amendment’s structurally identical Counsel, Jury Trial, and
Confrontation Clauses. I advocate eliminating the “trial-right-only” theory
of the Confrontation Clause to allow cross-examination of testimonial
statements that are material to punishment and where cross-examination
assists in assessing truth.
The trial-right-only rule has endured longer in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence than both Counsel and Jury Trial Clause jurisprudence.
Three years after ratification of the Sixth Amendment, a North Carolina
court of equity expressed one of the earliest interpretations of the
222
confrontation right in State v. Webb: “[I]t is a rule of the common law,
founded on natural justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence
223
which he had not the liberty to cross examine.” Over the next century,
state and federal courts retreated from Webb and confrontation became
224
linked with hearsay rules. By the late twentieth century, confrontation
and hearsay rules were generally thought to arise from the same due
process origins and serve the same purposes of trustworthiness and
225
reliability.
Circuit courts that have ruled that confrontation rights do not apply
226
227
at felony sentencing rely primarily on Barber v. Page and Mancusi v.
228
Barber succinctly states, “[t]he right to confrontation is
Stubbs.

222. 2 N.C. 103 (1 Hayw. 103) (1794).
223. Id. at 104.
224. Compare Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. 58, 59–60 (2 Yer. 58) (1821) (holding that because the
witness died before trial, reading of deposition testimony into evidence did not violate confrontation
principles) and Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 239–44 (1895) (holding that deceased witness
was sufficiently unavailable for trial for purposes of hearsay exception), with Motes v. United States,
178 U.S. 458, 471–75 (1900) (holding admission at trial of statements made at preliminary hearing
violated the Confrontation Clause due to an insufficient showing of unavailability). See generally
Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 73 (1895) (holding that the failure to conduct a preliminary
examination of the accused did not result in a confrontation violation).
225. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (stating it is a “truism that ‘hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,’ and ‘stem from the same
roots.’” (internal citations omitted)); see also Fenner, supra note 21, at 37.
226. See supra note 2.
227. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
228. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
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229

230

basically a trial right,” but Barber was not a felony sentencing case.
Neither was Mancusi, although the ruling in that case affected Stubbs’s
punishment. Stubbs was convicted and sentenced under New York’s
second offender law based in part on a Tennessee murder conviction that
231
had been overturned due to the denial of effective counsel. The New
York court admitted witness statements from the prior Tennessee trial
232
over Stubbs’s objection. The Mancusi Court found that there was
sufficient evidence that the testimony of the unavailable Tennessee
233
Thus, the overturned Tennessee murder
witness was reliable.
conviction could be counted as the predicate offense under New York’s
second offender law.
Barber and Mancusi rely heavily on the assumption that
confrontation has always enjoyed a peaceful coexistence with hearsay
234
Barber and Mancusi were decided at a time when literal
rules.
application of the Confrontation Clause was rejected for fear of abrogating
235
most of the hearsay exceptions. Both cases turn on the prosecution’s
good faith showing of unavailability and defendant’s prior opportunity to
236
cross-examine the witness. Barber and Mancusi upheld the erroneous
principle that because confrontation and hearsay were rooted in due
237
238
process, reliability was a sufficient surrogate for cross-examination at
239
trial. Ohio v. Roberts best articulates that principle:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate “indicia of reliability.” Reliability can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least
240
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.

229. Barber, 390 U.S. at 725.
230. Barber objected at trial to the admission of un-cross-examined preliminary hearing testimony.
Id. at 720–21. The Court granted habeas relief on the ground that state authorities failed to make good
faith efforts to obtain the witness. Id. at 724–26.
231. Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 207–10.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 216.
234. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1990). But see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155–56
(1970) (warning against the assumption that the overlap between hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause is complete or the assumption that confrontation rights are nothing more than a codification of
hearsay rules and their exceptions).
235. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
236. Id. at 65–77.
237. Id. at 66.
238. Chhablani, supra note 10, at 514 (citing John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real
Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
191, 206 (1999)).
239. United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 711–12 (1978).
240. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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Like Barber and Mancusi, Roberts established that the Confrontation
Clause reflected only a “preference for face-to-face confrontation at
241
trial.” Roberts was arrested and charged with forgery and possession of
242
stolen credit cards. At trial, Roberts testified that Anita Isaacs, the
243
daughter of the victims, provided the checkbook and credit cards with
244
the understanding that he was allowed to use them. Upon questioning
by defense counsel at the preliminary hearing Isaacs admitted that she
knew Roberts and that she permitted Roberts to stay at her apartment
for several days while she was away, but that she neither gave Roberts
her parents’ checks and credit cards nor granted him permission to use
245
246
them. Because Isaacs did not appear at trial, the prosecution was
allowed to admit her preliminary hearing transcript to rebut Roberts’s
247
testimony. While acknowledging that the Confrontation Clause was
intended to limit some hearsay, the Roberts Court affirmed Mancusi and
Barber to the extent that where a witness was unavailable, the
confrontation requirement was satisfied by hearsay that was reliable and
248
trustworthy. The Court found that the prosecution made a good faith
showing of unavailability and that Roberts had an adequate opportunity
249
to cross-examine Isaacs during the preliminary hearing.
Roberts, Mancusi, and Barber are incompatible outliers from the
Court’s more recent interpretations of the Confrontation Clause,
250
Crawford involved the
beginning with Crawford v. Washington.
admission of pre-recorded testimonial statements by a wife against her

241. See id. at 63–64 (emphasis added); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846, 849 (1990)
(reasoning that the primary purpose of confrontation is to ensure reliability and face-to-face
confrontation is only a preference).
242. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
243. The checks were in the name of Barnard Isaacs and the stolen credit cards belong to both
Barnard and his wife, Amy. Id.
244. Id. at 59.
245. Id. at 58. According to the Court, defense counsel neither asked to have Isaacs declared a
hostile witness nor requested permission cross-examine her. Id.
246. Id. at 59–60. Five subpoenas for four different trial dates were sent to Isaacs at her parents’
Ohio residence. Id. at 59. Anita was not present upon execution, nor did she contact the court. Id.
Before admission of the transcript, the trial judge conducted a voir dire of Isaacs’s mother who
testified she infrequently received telephone calls and knew of no emergency contact information for
her daughter. Id. at 59–60.
247. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the prosecution failed to make a good faith
showing of unavailability. Id. at 60. The court of appeals noted the state’s failure to seek Isaacs’s
whereabouts for purposes of trial or otherwise determine whether she could be found. Id. The Ohio
Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s finding on availability, but held that Roberts was not
afforded a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Isaacs at the preliminary hearing.
Id. at 60–61. The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that increased due diligence would not have procured
Isaacs’s attendance at trial because her whereabouts were entirely unknown, but that defense
counsel’s questioning at the preliminary hearing did not amount to a cross-examination. Id.
248. Id. at 65–67.
249. Id. at 74–77.
250. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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husband, the defendant, and against whom she could not testify based on
251
spousal privilege. The Washington Supreme Court had previously
affirmed admission of Mrs. Crawford’s recorded statements, satisfied
252
that they were both reliable and trustworthy. The Crawford Court
reversed and reasoned that hearsay rules have strayed too far from
253
confrontation’s “original meaning.”
Crawford recognized two historical inferences about the Founders’
understanding of confrontation: first, the Confrontation Clause was
intended to prohibit ex parte examinations as evidence against the
254
second, preratification testimonial statements of absent
accused;
witnesses would not have been allowed without a showing of unavailability
255
and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The Crawford Court
256
ruled that the due process standard was too unpredictable.
Confrontation standards were higher: “Where testimonial statements are
at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional
257
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”
The Court ultimately found that Mrs. Crawford’s statements closely
258
paralleled those the Framers intended to regulate and that the
admission of those statements violated Mr. Crawford’s confrontation
259
rights. Noting that “testimonial statements” can be used for purposes
260
other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted, the Court

251. Id. at 38–40.
252. Id. at 41. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed and found that Mrs. Crawford’s
statements contradicted previous statements made in response to specific questions and that at one
point Mrs. Crawford admitted she closed her eyes during the incident for which her husband was on
trial. Id.
253. Id. at 60. But see Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know
It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 105, 120–89, 196–206 (2005)
(questioning the historical accuracy of Crawford’s reasoning that cross-examination and unavailability
would have been required at the time of the Founding, as well as the use of non-testimonial
statements; also arguing that Crawford glossed over important distinctions between felony and
misdemeanor procedure and that at the Founding, the law had yet to fully develop hearsay rules or
their exceptions).
254. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
255. Id. at 53–54.
256. Id. at 60–67 (examining and discussing inconsistencies in the application of hearsay rules in
post-Roberts confrontation cases).
257. See id. at 68–69; see also id. at 61 (“Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation . . . [which] . . . reflects a judgment . . . about how
reliability can be best determined.”).
258. See id. at 52 (concluding statements taken by police officers in the course of “interrogations
bear a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in England”); see also Fisher,
supra note 126, at 59 (describing Crawford as a “thoroughgoing originalist opinion”).
259. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53. The Court found the absence of an oath and the fact that the
interrogators were police officers irrelevant. Id.
260. Id. at 59 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).
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explicitly limited the scope of the Confrontation Clause to “witnesses
261
against the accused” who “bear testimony.”
Crawford’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause applied only to
testimonial statements; non-testimonial statements did not require more
262
than reliability. Davis v. Washington clarified the distinction between
263
Davis involved the
testimonial and non-testimonial statements.
admissibility of statements of unavailable witnesses in unrelated criminal
trials in Washington state and Indiana. The Washington courts concluded
that statements made in response to questions from 911 operator who
answered a victim’s call about a domestic dispute were non-testimonial
264
and admissible. The Indiana courts disagreed about admission of a
victim affidavit that was executed and given to law enforcement officers
who responded to a domestic disturbance complaint at the victim’s
265
Davis held that statements were testimonial when the
home.
circumstances objectively indicated that no ongoing emergency existed and
that the primary purpose of the interrogation (or questioning) was to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a subsequent criminal
266
prosecution. Statements are non-testimonial, however, when given in
the course of an interrogation (or questioning) and where circumstances
objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
267
assist police during an ongoing emergency.
Crawford makes clear that actual confrontation and crossexamination are the best methods to test the veracity of testimonial
statements, and Davis demonstrates the fluidity of the testimonial/non268
testimonial distinction. As confrontation speaks to the method of

261. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
262. Id. at 68.
263. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
264. Id. at 818–19. In the call, the defendant’s ex-girlfriend provided defendant’s name and accused
him of assault. Id. at 817–18. The defendant was present during this portion of the call. Id. After
informing the operator that the defendant left the scene, the victim described the context of the assault
and provided other identifying information about the defendant. Id. at 818.
265. Id. at 819–21. Officers found the victim alone on her front porch; she later gave permission for
them to enter the home where the defendant, her husband was waiting in the kitchen. Id. at 819. After
questioning the victim in her living room, officers provided an affidavit which she filled out and signed.
Id. at 819–20. One officer remained in the kitchen with the defendant, who attempted to participate in
the conversation. Id.
266. Id. at 822.
267. Id.
268. Id. (noting that while in Crawford a core class of testimonial statements were set forth, it was
“unnecessary to endorse any of them, because ‘some statements qualify under any definition’”)
(citation omitted). The Davis Court reasoned that “[w]ell into the 20th century . . . Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence was carefully applied only in the testimonial context.” Id. at 824–25 (citations
omitted). The testimonial character of the statement separated it from other hearsay that was subject
to traditional limitations barring admission, but not the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 821. Statements
taken by police officers in the course of interrogations were considered to be in the core class of
testimonial statements. Id.
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testing evidence, the rules governing the method of testing could easily
apply at felony sentencing, and already leave vast room for judicial
269
discretion. The Guidelines place no limitations on the use of information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a convicted
270
defendant. Sentencing courts can reach far back in time to determine
271
This
what conduct relates to the defendant’s convicted offense.
evidence may include statements recorded by probation officers during
telephone interviews or signed witness statements gathered by law
272
enforcement or prosecutors. Such reports and statements are likely to
273
include hearsay, double hearsay, and triple hearsay. During plea
negotiations, defense counsel may be unaware which testimonial
statements, if any, will be presented at sentencing. Moreover, there is
usually little opportunity to investigate the statement’s veracity once its
materiality becomes apparent. Despite these serious implications,
reliability is the current standard to test information presented at felony
274
sentencing hearings.
Testing the veracity of testimonial statements that are material to
punishment is as compelling at felony sentencing as Crawford and Davis
recognize at trial. Originally, the purpose of trial was to establish the
275
specific offense conduct that merited punishment. The purpose of
276
sentencing was to announce the punishment. Little judicial discretion

269. But see Becker, supra note 7, at 2 (warning that the combination of guidelines sentencing and
expansive judicial discretion may cause serious adverse consequences to defendants).
270. Ngov, supra note 6, at 267 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012)); Becker, supra note 7, at 2 n.6.
271. Ngov, supra note 6, at 237–38.
272. See United States v. O’Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1223 (8th Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is a sad but true fact
of life under the Guidelines that many of the crucial judgment calls in sentencing are now made, not
by the court, but by probation officers.”) (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
John S. Dierna, Guideline Sentencing: Probation Officer Responsibilities and Interagency Issues,
53 Fed. Probation 3, 3 (1989). In the federal regime, probation officers play a critical role as the
court’s independent investigator. Id. Probation officers prepare all sections of the presentence report
provided to the judge, including the tentative advisory guideline range based on the information
gathered during the investigation. See id.; see also Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Second
Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 357, 364 (1992); Becker, supra note
7, at 8.
273. Becker, supra note 7, at 161.
274. Use of acquitted conduct as a category of “relevant conduct” essentially second-guesses a jury’s
prior determination about the veracity of testimonial statements. Despite the jury’s declaration of “legal
innocence,” federal courts permit use of acquitted conduct to increase punishment. Ngov, supra note 6, at
258–60 nn.142–50, 284, 287 (discussing impact of acquitted conduct on subsequent proceedings, including
probation and parole revocation hearings). Thus, in some cases, “a defendant can be sentenced to the
same length of imprisonment that would have been imposed had he actually been convicted of the
offense.” Id. at 242. But see Blackstone, supra note 30, at *361–62 (“If the jury therefore find the
prisoner not guilty, he is then for ever [sic] quit and discharged of the accusation.”). The prosecution is
given a “second bite at the apple” to prove conduct already rejected as punishable, allowing the
sentencing judge to ignore the jury’s previous findings. Ngov, supra note 6, at 261, 267, 288, 291.
275. White, supra note 29, at 397.
276. See id.; see also Becker, supra note 7, at 5–6.
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existed pre-Founding to influence felony sentencing.
Modern
sentencing procedure developed post-Founding and has shifted fact
finding for purposes of fixing punishment into a structured sentencing
278
hearing that occurs independent of the trial. Once guilt is rendered,
either as a result of a verdict or a plea, sentencing becomes the focus of
all parties and an accurate determination of facts that influence the
279
sentence should be of primary importance for all parties.
Apprendi warned that modern courts must adhere to constitutional
280
principles even though the practice of unitary trial and sentencing may
have changed. Alleyne provides a timely reminder of Apprendi’s
warning. Alleyne’s vigorous (and successful) defense of the brandishing
281
The Guidelines
“element” was essentially rendered meaningless.
allowed reconsideration of Alleyne’s acquitted conduct, specifically the
282
brandishing charge, as a category of “relevant conduct.” Alleyne’s
sentencing court allowed the prosecution to re-allege brandishing as an
“enhancement” and therefore prove it by a lower burden. Alleyne was
283
punished as if the jury actually found brandishing. For the Alleyne
Court, the inherent unfairness of these procedures, from a sentencing
284
prospective, were no trivial matter and quite troubling. So too is that
fact that defense counsel was not allowed use of the most effective tools
to re-defend the allegation, namely cross-examination of the testimonial
statements that supported the post-trial “finding” that brandishing
occurred.

277. Blackstone, supra note 30, *378.
278. McMurray, supra note 23, at 592; Douglass, supra note 28, at 1972; Becker, supra note 7, at 6–
7 (describing guidelines sentencing as thoroughly fact driving).
279. Becker, supra note 7, at 2.
280. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483–84 (2000). But see id. at 518 (describing decision as
a return to a status quo that reflected the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment, not as a sharp
break from the past) (Thomas, J., concurring).
281. Ngov, supra note 6, at 261, 267, 288, 291 (arguing that it would be impossible for innocence to
have any significance if the sentencing court is allowed to use acquitted conduct to increase the
sentence; that there should be new evidence to warrant or justify a court’s reconsideration of acquitted
conduct; and that such an outcome is nonsensical and in contravention of recent Supreme Court Jury
Trial Clause precedent, including Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker).
282. Id. at 267 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012)).
283. See id. at 258–60 nn.142–50, 242, 284; see also, id. at 287. (discussing impact of acquitted
conduct on subsequent proceedings, including probation and revocation hearings). The Court
addressed the use of acquitted conduct as a basis for punishment in a pre-Crawford per curiam opinion
that held use of such information did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Watts,
519 U.S. 148, 155 (1997) (“[A]n acquittal is not a finding of any fact. . . . Without specific jury findings,
no one can logically or realistically draw any factual inferences.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Even if acquittals only mean that the reasonable doubt standard was not met, not that the defendant is
actually innocent, reconsideration of acquitted conduct is inherently unfair. Ngov, supra note 6, at 242
(citing Barry L. Johnson, If at First You Don’t Succeed—Abolishing the Use of Acquitted Conduct in
Guidelines Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 153, 182–83 (1996)).
284. See Ngov, supra note 6, at 242 (citing Johnson, supra note 283, at 182–83).
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Due to the prevalence of plea bargaining, most cases do not result in
a trial like in Alleyne. As a result, the resolution of the material facts
constituting the offense occurs after the plea and usually requires the use
285
of testimonial statements at sentencing. In this manner, the sentencing
hearing itself becomes quite similar to a trial but results in sentencing by
286
ambush from the defendant’s perspective. The inability to crossexamine testimonial statements ties defense counsel’s hands and leaves
the defendant with no meaningful opportunity to test the material
287
evidence that supports the punishment. Counsel’s ability to marshal
and prove the facts, introduce evidence, and generally aid and assist the
288
defendant is also significantly hindered. Allowing cross-examination of
testimonial statements to prove the sentencing offense lessens the risk
289
that the defendant will be punished based on unreliable evidence.
This is not to say that confrontation should be required for all felony
290
sentencing information. Instead, when determining whether to require
cross-examination of testimonial statements at felony sentencing, two
key factors are the statement’s materiality to punishment and whether
cross-examination will assist in assessing veracity or truth. Determining
whether testimonial statements would assist in an assessment of truth is
unnecessary where material facts about the sentencing offense are
admitted by the defendant and entered into the record (or plea
agreement) at the time the plea is accepted. At the sentencing, the trial
judge can ascertain a defendant’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
acceptance of the statement’s veracity in the same manner as the court
establishes the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary acknowledgement or
waiver of other constitutional rights at sentencing. Where the parties do
not agree, cross-examination should be allowed at felony sentencing.

Conclusion
An accurate determination of the facts that support the punishment is
primary to the integrity of the U.S. criminal justice system. Bifurcated trial
and sentencing is a modern felony sentencing development, but
constitutional principles must still be obeyed. The fundamental unfairness
and prejudice associated with punishing a defendant based on un-crossexamined testimonial statements provides sufficient reason to unbrand
285. James Edward Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas 156–57 (1975) (noting that
sentencing judges rarely make detailed inquiries regarding the factual basis for the plea before
accepting it).
286. See Becker, supra note 7, at 7–10.
287. See id. at 9.
288. See id. at 8.
289. Id. at 19 (describing the Confrontation Clause as the obvious candidate to ensure basic
fairness at sentencing proceedings).
290. In State v. Hurt, 616 S.E.2d 910 (N.C. 2005), the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the trialright-only theory of confrontation rights and recognized the pivotal role of counsel at modern sentencing.
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confrontation as a right that only applies at the trial stage of the criminal
prosecution. Crawford and Davis make clear that actual confrontation
and cross-examination are the best methods to assess the veracity of
291
testimonial statements. Eliminating the “trial-right-only” theory of the
Confrontation Clause creates uniformity with the structurally identical
Counsel and Jury Trial Clauses. To be sure, confrontation should not be
required for all evidence presented at felony sentencing hearings. Two key
factors when determining whether to require cross-examination of
testimonial statements at felony sentencing are the statement’s materiality
to punishment and whether cross-examination will assist in assessing truth.
Where both prongs of this inquiry are met, confrontation should be
expanded through the sentencing stage of the felony prosecution.

291. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825–26 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
69 (2004).
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